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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
George B. Handy, defendant, appeals from a judgment of the court rendered by Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
The Record on appeal consists of the pleadings,
minute entries, pre-trial order, judgment and similar
papers.
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STATE~1ENT OF FACTS

The defendant, George B. Handy, is an attorney at
law, admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah and all state courts.
In November, 1957, he was employed by one Cleo
N. Smith, to institute action against one Esther Morris
for injuries sustained by plaintiff Smith in an automobile accident with defendant Morris. Pre-trial hearing
was had in the matter March 20, 1958 and the matter
set for jury trial on April 29, 1958.
On April 29th, 1958, which ·was the day set for trial,
neither plaintiff Cleo Smith, nor her counsel, George B.
Handy, appeared and Judge Stewart ~I. Hanson, on
motion of defendant's counsel entered a judgment by
default wherein plaintiff Smith's action against defendant Morris was dismissed.
At this point, George B. Handy, who had heretofore
merely been counsel for plaintiff Smith, suddenly, without service upon him of Summons or Complaint found
himself designated as "Defendant" in an action designated "District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, Plaintiff versus George B. Handy, defendant and
judgment entered against him for the costs of impanelling
sixteen jurors, in the sum of $128.00.
The Court, in stating a reason for this action, seemed
to be quite concerned about the lack of courtesy on the
part of plaintiff S1nith and her counsel in not appearing
for trial, nor in notifying the court of their intention
not to appear.
2
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL FOR COSTS OF IMPANELLING THE JURY.

Prior to discussing what defendant Handy considers
to be the sole issue raised by the judgment of the court,
the appellant herein admits that neither plaintiff Smith
nor her counsel informed the court that they did not
intend to appear for trial and appellant herein assumes
whatever censure there may be for this omission
It should first be noted that defendant Handy was
made a defendant and judgment entered aginst him
without any compliance being made with Rule 3, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure which required the service of
Summons and the filing of the complaint in accordance
with the age old custom of giving a defendant the opportunity of having his day in court. The first and only
notice Handy received of the courts action was the notice
from the clerk that he had 10 days to pay up or have
judgment entered against him.
Rule 54 (d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the
only statute or rule we have which pertains to the
awarding or taxing of costs. This rule, insofar as it is
material to this case is as follows:
(d) COSTS
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express provision therefore is made either in a statute of
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs ;
3
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There is no provision in the above rule, either expressly or by implication for costs of any nature to be
imposed upon counsel for one of the parties, much less
the costs of impanelling the jury. The only significance
to be given to the above phrase "unless the court otherwise directs" is that the court has discretion as to
whether costs will be awarded to the prevailing party,
to neither, and both parties to bear their own costs or
to be apportioned between the parties in some other
way. This seems to be born out by the practice of the
courts and the authorities cited herein.
Rule 54 (d) as cited above superseded sections 10444-1 to 18 inclusive and 104-44-21, Utah Code Annotated,
1943. There was no provision in the superseded statutes
for the awarding of costs of any nature or the taxing
of costs of any nature against the counsel of one of the
parties. As found in the annotations for rule 54 (d),
U.R.C.P. the Rules Committee in the preparation and
drafting of these rules had this to say:
"The above rule leaves the matter of costs
somewhat to the discretion of the court and to
that extent is inconsistent with our present statutory provisions which set out the various situations where costs are awarded, ****It is intended,
however, that the court will follow the former
practice, insofar as applicable, in assessing costs."
It is of great importance to note the type of costs
taxed against defendant, costs of iinpanelling a jury.
Even where it is proper to impose payment of costs, there
is no precedent for ordering a proper party to pay such
costs.
4
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The Utah case of Fowler vs. Gillman 76 U. 414, 430;
290 P. 358 held :
"costs are mere incident to judgment to which
they attach and are allowances to reimburse the
successful party for expenses incurred in presenting or defending an action or special proceeding."
If this is so, and we must assume that it is the law,
or a correct interpretation of it, the taxing of the costs
of impanelling a jury against plaintiff's counsel is without a basis in law because such costs could not possibly
be construed as "allowances to reimburse the successful
party for expenses incurred".
In the Utah case of Houghton vs. Barton, 49 U. 611;
165 P. 471, it was held:
"as costs were unknown at common law, the right,
therefore to tax and recover costs in an action
or proceeding is purely statutory and statutes
authorizing them are strictly construed.
See also Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 80 U. 9, 12; 12 P
2 364.
Therefore, according to Utah law, where the statute
does not permit the assessing of cost of impanelling the
jury as an item of costs and the statute does not allow
the assessing of such costs against the counsel for one
of the parties, the court was without authority to enter
judgment against counsel as was done and the judgment
rendered in the matter is void.
The following are holdings under the Federal rule
which is identical to the Utah rule.
5
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In the case of Strong vs. Broward Country Kennel
Club, 77 F. Supp. 262, a derivative action was brought
by a stockholder by the name of McRitchie against the
corporation. l\icRitchie was not a party to the action,
because he was not a resident of Florida, the state in
which the action was brought, but he was prosecuting
the action in the names of two other stockholders who
never appeared and testified. The action was dismissed
and in taxing costs, the court held against the recommendation of the special master in taxing costs and stated:
"Although McRitchie was the sole stockholder
actively prosecuting the ligitagion, because he was
not a party to the litigation, the court was without
authority to tax costs against him.''
The case of In Re Childs Co., 52 Fed. Supp., 89, 91
in part concerned itself with the awarding and taxing
of costs in a bankruptcy action and it concerned itself
with the interpretation of Section 2 (18), 11 U.S.C.A.
because of the request of one of the answering creditors
to tax costs against one of the petitioning creditors. It
held:
"Section 2 ( 18) speaks of 'parties' and the general rule is that no judgment for costs can be
rendered against a person not a party to the
suit." 20 C.J.S. Costs, Section 120, page 360.

Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 20, page 360, Section 120
"The general rule is well settled that no judgment
for costs can be rendered against a person not
a party to the suit. There must be express statutory provision to permit the awarding of costs
against one not a party to the record." Citing
6
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Tulare County vs. City of Dinuba, 220 P. 201
(Cal) ; Lindsley vs. City & County of Denver, 196
P. 859, (Colo.)
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 14, Section 29, page 1.9
"As a general rule, costs are not recoverable by
or taxable against a person who is not a party
to the suit.''

American Jurisprudence, Vol. 14, Section 32, page .:!1
"Usually an attorney is not liable for costs of
an action in connection with which he is employed."
If the court in the instant case acted properly in
taxing costs of impanelling the jury, against Counsel
Handy, next it would appear that any attorney who
brings action that seems non-meritorious to the court
could be taxed with the costs of impanelling the jury and
for such costs of retaining them, regardless of the number
of days the jury sat. I admit that this does not seem to
be a logical extension of the courts powers, and certainly
not a power we would care to see the court exercise,
but I consider it a logical extension of power if the action
in the instant case is condoned.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing authorities and from the facts
as stated I submit to the court that the District Court
of Salt Lake County, erred in entering judgment against
defendant Handy for costs of impanelling the jury in
the matter of Smith vs Morris.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE B. HANDY
7
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